Th is paper argues that developing countries' growth successes and collapses tend to cluster in specifi c time periods-and that only the existence of a global development cycle can explain this. Th e cycle refl ects the external factors that aff ect all, or large clusters of developing countries, and thus constrain their growth possibilities. Nonetheless, country-specifi c factors-particularly patterns of specialization-play a signifi cant role in determining growth dynamics. From this perspective, the paper shows a very large diff erence between the economic growth of developing countries diversifying into higher technology manufacturing exports and those experiencing success in natural resource intensive sectors. 
The Dual Divergence: Growth Successes and Collapses in the Developing World since 1980
José Antonio Ocampo and María Angela Parra 1 Cross-country econometrics has been the preferred tool of empirical growth analysis over the past 20 years. Th is literature has tended to focus the analysis on long time periods, ignoring the instability and volatility of growth patterns in developing countries. Because shocks play a central role in explaining variations in growth patterns in the developing world (Easterly and others, 1993) , the meaning of the statistical coeffi cient estimated for long periods of time is unclear. In this sense, the use of panel data econometrics for shorter periods may be more appropriate, although, for many reasons, not ideal (Pritchett, 2000) . Another route is to examine factors that determine growth spurts (accelerations) and collapses. Country-specifi c historical analysis is a third route (see, for example, Rodrik, 2003, among others) , but the comparability of such analyses is a signifi cant limitation in this regard.
Th is paper takes the second route, focusing on growth surges and collapses in developing countries and their relation to common external factors that aff ect the economic performance of these countries. It also looks at the role of patterns of specialization in explaining relative growth performance in recent decades. Th e fi rst section presents a survey of the still limited empirical literature on growth spurts and collapses. Th e second section looks at the incidence of accelerations and collapses of growth in developing countries since 1950 and identifi es a "global development cycle" that circumscribes developing economies' growth possibilities. Th e third focuses on the role in this context of specialization patterns and production development strategies. Th e fourth presents some conclusions. Some of the facts that are mentioned are well known, yet, curiously enough, have been generally disregarded in the growth literature.
Survey of literature on growth spurts and collapses
In one of the best known studies on economic growth instability in the developing world Easterly and others (1993) show that a large part of the variance of growth rates of developing countries, even in periods as long as a decade, can be directly explained by shocks: in the terms of trade, in debt crises and sharp changes in net external transfers, and in the form of wars. Furthermore, shocks have an indirect infl uence on growth by inducing policy changes. In turn, Easterly (2001) underscores the greater vulnerability of poor countries to natural disasters, compared to middle-and high-income countries. Th e greater sensitivity of low-income countries-particularly Sub-Saharan African countries-to these problems, as well as to civil wars, explains the greater dispersion of growth rates among them.
Looking at discontinuities in the growth experience is important for several reasons. First, the hypothetical determinants of economic growth may have non-linear eff ects, which imply that the same policy may have diff erent eff ects in diff erent countries and time periods. Non-linear interactions as well as (positive or negative) feedbacks are involved, for example, in the interaction between human capital and economic development (Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez, 2000) . 2 As a result of non-linearities and the inconclusiveness of existing econometric results, 3 it may be impossible to draw policy implications from cross-country econometrics (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Easterly, 2005; Rodríguez, 2006; Rodrik, 2005) .
Th e second reason is that in economies experiencing substantial shocks, it may be impossible to isolate long-term trends from observable short-term trajectories. Th e major explanation for this is the path dependence generated by dynamic economies of scale: the close association between technological learning and production experience (i.e. "learning by doing" in a broad sense), as well as similar processes related to the development of marketing networks and the growth of fi rms' reputation (goodwill). Th is means that both negative shocks (an external crisis, a natural disaster, or a war) and positive shocks (the discovery of new natural resources) may have long-term implications. 4 A related issue is that the formation of expectations in economies facing recurrent shocks necessarily involves a learning process (Heymann, 2000) .
Th e origins of shocks are obviously important in this regard. Given the emphasis of the existing growth literature on the domestic factors that determine the growth performance of developing countries, the role of external shocks aff ecting performance generally has been downplayed or even ignored in cross-country econometrics. In contrast, external factors have been the focus of the structuralist tradition, with its emphasis on the asymmetries that characterize the functioning of the world economy (Ocampo and Martin, 2003) . As we will see, the role of external factors is critical, for major breaks in the growth process in the developing world tend to cluster around specifi c time periods, indicating that developing countries' economies tend to follow a common cycle, with major breaks clearly associated with the world economy.
Th e third reason why discontinuities are important is institutional in character. Although all forms of institution-building follow an evolutionary process, this feature is particularly important in State institution-building, again due to the "learning" processes involved. An interruption in the process of State building caused by a major economic crisis may thus have long-term implications, as a cursory look at the problems of Latin America following the "lost decade" indicates. Th e mix of an economic crisis with civil confl ict may be particularly problematic, as the experience of several Sub-Saharan African countries over the past quarter century shows. In turn, major political discontinuities, such as revolutions (capitalist as well as socialist) can unleash an institutional restructuring that takes time to mature and may have unexpected twists. Th e experience of Central and Eastern Europe is the most relevant recent story in this regard. A major implication of this analysis is that, even if a major structural reform eventually has positive long-term eff ects, it also has transitional costs that may swamp its favourable impacts for a long time. In terms of the debates of the 1980s, this implies that "big bangs" are much less attractive than was believed during the period of structural reforms. Nonetheless, the discussion below will concentrate on economic issues, largely leaving aside these institutional dimensions.
Finally, in terms of the evolution of economic structures, long-term growth should be understood as the result of sequential sector-specifi c growth spurts, of their intensity and of the domestic linkages that they 2 See the analysis of the variable eff ects of education in diff erent countries and time periods in Azariadis and Drazen (1990) . 3 Indeed, the voluminous literature on cross-country econometrics has identifi ed nearly 150 variables that have statistically signifi cant eff ects on growth (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005) . Because these variables do not necessarily exclude each other, with that technique alone it is impossible to know what priority should be given to each one of them (Brock and Durlauf, 2001 ). 4 See, for instance, Easterly (2001: ch. 10 ), or the analysis of "Dutch disease" by Krugman (1990: ch. 7), and van Wijnbergen (1984) .
generate. Th e noticeable discontinuities that characterize the evolution of production structures and specialization patterns imply that these factors may be crucial to understanding growth dynamics. Cross-country econometrics has failed to give adequate attention to this issue, emphasized in the structuralist tradition (see, for example, Amsden, 2001; Lall, 2001; Palma, 2004) . Th e Kaldorian links running from growth to productivity, associated with the presence of underutilized resources during the growth process, have also been disregarded, as well as the links between productivity convergence, domestic production linkages and external balances (Ocampo, 2005a; Rada and Taylor, 2004; Cimoli and Correa, 2005) .
Several attempts have been made in recent years to understand the role of discontinuities in the growth process. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) explore the determinants of episodes of economic growth acceleration since the 1950s. According to their results, accelerations are associated with increases in investment and trade, as well as with real exchange rate depreciation. Accelerations also appear to be linked to changes in political regimes. Positive terms of trade shocks have positive short-term eff ects, but they are not a signifi cant predictor of sustained accelerations. On the contrary, standard economic reform measures play no role in explaining growth accelerations, although they can help to explain whether or not growth is sustained. Th e major conclusion of that paper, however, is that most of the variables used in mainstream growth analyses do not seem to play an important role as determinants of growth spurts and, in this sense, growth spurts are highly unpredictable. Ros (2005) , in contrast, considers the factors determining growth collapses. He fi nds three factors that aff ect the incidence of such episodes. Th e fi rst is size: small economies are more likely to face collapses. Th e second is the pattern of specialization: dependence on raw material exports-particularly mineral exports-is associated with the incidence of reductions in per capita income. Th e third is income distribution: more unequal societies are likely to face growth collapses. According to Ros, political-economy issues are involved in the latter two links, whereas vulnerability to shocks clearly shows in the fi rst two. Reddy and Minoui (2005) examine a similar phenomenon: namely, real-income stagnation, which they defi ne as negligible or negative per capita real-income growth for a signifi cant uninterrupted sequence of years. Th ey fi nd that countries that suff ered spells of real income stagnation were more likely to be poor, dependent on primary commodity exports, confl ict ridden, and located in Latin America or Sub-Saharan Africa. A majority of landlocked developing countries also tend to be more likely to face long-term stagnation. Stagnation is also very likely to persist over time: countries affl icted with stagnation in the 1960s had a 75 per cent likelihood of being affl icted by stagnation in the 1990s as well. Jones and Olken (2005) claim that changes in physical capital accumulation are not important in explaining growth accelerations and that, at best, they explain only a quarter of the magnitude of growth collapses. Both events instead refl ect changes in productivity. Structural breaks are also associated with accelerations or decelerations in the allocation of labour to manufacturing, particularly to advanced manufacturing. Upturns are associated, in turn, with the evolution of trade shares, whereas infl ation plays some role in downturns. Th e authors fi nd that changes in productivity are the major determinant of both growth accelerations and collapses, but they fail to explain what determines major productivity shifts.
"Explaining" diff erences in growth rates as the result of diff erences in productivity growth, as do Jones and Olken (2005) and a voluminous literature, is however questionable, on at least two grounds. First, it ignores the short-term and perhaps even the medium-term Keynesian eff ects of changes in capacity utilization on productivity, which will bias analysis against the eff ects of capital accumulation.
5 Second, it ignores long-term Kaldorian growth-productivity dynamics, according to which strong positive and negative productivity trends are associated with the more or less intensive utilization of existing factors of production: variable underemployment of physical capital and of the labour force, including human capital; and variable underutilization of natural resources; and existing infrastructure. Th ese Kaldorian links, recently brought back to the debate by Ocampo (2005a) , Rada (2005) and Rada and Taylor (2004) imply that productivity improvements are largely the result of economic growth rather than an exogenous determinant of growth (as in the neoclassical development literature). More generally, to the extent that these Kaldorian links are valid, growth and productivity must be explained simultaneously.
The global development cycle
Th e widening income gap between diff erent regions and countries has been a feature of the world economy for the past two centuries (see Figure 1 , and Maddison, 1995 and . Th e only exception to this trend is the period [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] , in which the international per capita GDP gap decreased slightly (as we will point out below, the mid-2000s may be the beginning of another phase of this type, but it is too soon to say whether this refl ects a longer-term trend). Th e story of the developing countries is thus one of "divergence, big time" vis-à-vis the industrial world (Pritchett, 1997) , with the late phase of the "golden age" the only exception so far in history. Th is is also the conclusion of the analysis of the eff ects of inter-country inequality in world income distribution (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002) ; growing divergence among countries has also been a major contributor to the growing inequality of world income distribution over the past quarter century, if we isolate the eff ects of the rapid growth of China and, to a lesser extent, India (Berry and Serieux, 2004) .
History has also shown considerable divergence among developing countries, particularly since the mid-1960s (Figure 1 .C). Part of this divergence has been the result of several success stories ("miracles") at diff erent times in various parts of the developing world (China and India being the most recent ones). Th ere are, however, very few instances of "peripheral" countries that have joined the industrial "centre" (Japan being the notable exception in this regard, perhaps with some of the "fi rst-tier" Asian newly industrialized countries, or NICs). Th is implies that "miracles" have been more commonly followed by either stagnation at middle-or even low-income levels (a phenomenon that can be called "truncated convergence") or by outright collapses.
Th is brief overview of historical trends helps to underscore the basic "stylized fact" about the postwar development experience which serves as the starting point of this paper: unlike the "golden age" when there was fairly widespread growth in the developing world and, in its last phase (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) , some convergence of the real incomes of developing countries vis-à-vis the industrial world, the period since 1980 can be characterized as a "dual divergence", involving both lower growth rates of developing vis-à-vis industrial countries, but also strikingly diff erent growth experiences among developing countries (Figure 1) . Th e intermediate period, covering the years between the two oil shocks of the 1970s, was a mixed story: still high average growth in the developing countries, but very high divergence among them. 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1965 1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-2001 A. Weighted average per capita GDP growth 43 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1965 1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-2001 C. Standard deviation of per capita GDP growth -1913 1913-1950 1950-1965 1965-1973 1973-1980 1980-1990 1990-2001 Source: Authors' calculations based on Maddison (2001) .
Th e story can best be told in terms of the frequency of episodes of sustained economic growth and collapses over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, about 40 per cent of developing countries could be considered success stories (annual average per-capita GDP growth greater than 3 per cent at least over a fi ve-year period), but this proportion fell to less than 20 per cent through most of the past quarter century (Figure 2 ). In contrast, less than 15 per cent of the countries had negative growth during the 1960s and 1970s, but that proportion increased to over 40 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s. Collapses (defi ned in this graph as growth rates of -3 per cent per capita or less over at least a fi ve-year period) were rather nonexistent during the "golden age" but then shot up and became frequent during the "lost decade" of the 1980s (in several parts of the developing world and not only in Latin America) and in the early 1990s (when collapses were common in the former USSR, Central and Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa).
A similar story arises in Pritchett (2000) , who catalogues countries according to the growth pattern followed before or after a statistically determined structural break, which, on average, fell around 1977-78. According to this classifi cation, out of the 88 countries included in his analysis, 7 followed a steep hill; 6 13 followed a hill pattern, with steady growth around 1.5 per cent, generally insuffi cient for convergence with the industrial centre; and 7 accelerated 7 after the break. Th e majority of developing countries fall under the less appealing categories of growth followed by stagnation (12 plateaus), growth followed by contraction (32 mountains) and stagnation, or very slow growth in both periods (17 plains). Th is means that, for more than half of developing countries, growth slowed down after the structural break, while very few experienced the opposite trend.
Using a criterion of "success" similar to that used by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) to defi ne "sustained expansions" (four consecutive fi ve-year periods with growth over 2 per cent per capita 8 ), we get again a similar picture: successful growth clustered in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 3a) . Th ose experiences 6 Fast growth, above 3 per cent per capita, before and after the break. 7 GDP growth below 1.5 per cent before the break, followed by growth above 1.5 per cent. 8 Four consecutive fi ve-year periods are equivalent to an eight-year period. For example, if the fi rst period is 1964-1968, for it to be considered a sustained expansion or contraction, the periods 1965-1969, 1966-1970 and 1967-1971 also have to be periods of 2 per cent average growth (expansion) or negative growth (contraction). 1951-1955 1953-1957 1955-1959 1957-1961 1959-1963 1961-1965 1963-1967 1965-1969 1967-1971 1969-1973 1971-1975 1973-1977 1975-1979 1977-1981 1979-1983 1981-1985 1983-1987 1985-1989 1987-1991 1989-1993 1991-1995 1993-1997 1995-1999 1997-2001 Collapse (x < -3%)
Success (x>3%) Source: Authors' calculations based on Maddison (2001) .
were widespread in the developing world during the "golden age", tended to disappear in the 1980s, except in East Asia, and became somewhat more common in the 1990s, but at levels far below those of the "golden age". A similar criterion to defi ne "sustained contractions" (four consecutive fi ve-year periods with negative GDP growth per capita 9 ) indicates that they were rather infrequent before the fi rst oil shock, then tended to appear more frequently in Africa between the two oil shocks, to become widespread during the "lost decade" of the 1980s and the fi rst half of the 1990s (Figure 3b ).
Th e cumulative eff ect of successes and collapses is summarized in Table 1 . Between two-fi fths and one-half of developing countries experienced a fair rate of growth (25 per cent per capita over a decade) from the 1950s to the 1970s; this fell to less than one-fi fth during the "lost decade" and increased again in the 1990s, although at levels far below those of the "golden age". Experiences of very rapid growth (over 50 per cent in a decade) were quite common from the 1950s to the 1970s, yet very infrequent since. In turn, experiences of negative or highly negative growth were very infrequent in the 1950s and 1960s, started to become more common in the 1970s, shot up in the 1980s and were still very frequent in the 1990s. Seen as 9 See footnote 8. 1951-1958 1953-1960 1955-1962 1957-1964 1959-1966 1961-1968 1963-1970 1965-1972 1967-1974 1969-1976 1971-1978 1973-1980 1975-1982 1977-1984 1979-1986 1981-1988 1983-1990 1985-1992 1987-1994 1989-1996 1991-1998 1993-2000 -1958 1953-1960 1955-1962 1957-1964 1959-1966 1961-1968 1963-1970 1965-1972 1967-1974 1969-1976 1971-1978 1973-1980 1975-1982 1977-1984 1979-1986 1981-1988 1983-1990 1985-1992 1987-1994 1989-1996 1991-1998 1993-2000 Source: Authors' calculations based on Maddison (2001) .
Note: First, 5-year moving averages of per capita GDP growth rates were calculated. Th en we counted the number of countries that experience a rate below 0 per cent and of those which experience a rate above 2 per cent. Finally, we only consider the cases in which 4 of those moving averages fulfi ll consecutively those conditions. a whole, therefore, the era of structural reforms in the developing world still has a long way to go to match the performance of the period of high State intervention in development. And the transition from one era to the next has already been registered in history as a long and costly one.
A clear way to summarize the evidence is that growth successes and collapses tend to cluster in specifi c time periods. It is unlikely that the domestic factors explored in the growth literature can explain such clustering. Th us, we have to rely on common external factors, as well as on domestic policies that transmit their eff ects in developing countries (particularly pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies that tend to reinforce, rather than smooth out, the domestic eff ects of external shocks; see Ocampo, 2005b) . Th e outstanding diff erence between "the dual divergence" and the "golden age" has been the signifi cant increase in the frequency of growth collapses and the much lower frequency of growth successes over the last quarter century .
Th e clustering of both successes and collapses implies that a global development cycle has dominated the medium-term trajectory followed by developing countries. Th is cycle should be understood as the average growth performance of developing countries resulting from a set of external factors that aff ects all or large clusters of them, and thus constrains each country's growth possibilities. While, historically, these factors have been associated with dynamic processes originating in the industrial world, they have also increasingly encompassed the global eff ects of events originating in developing countries with systemic importance. Th ese determinants of the cycle may have diverging eff ects on diff erent countries and regions. In this sense, the average growth trajectory is not inconsistent with variable performance within the developing world and, particularly, with strong regional dimensions.
Given the leading role played by the industrial world in determining the global development cycle, it is not surprising that the cycle coincides, to some extent, with the average growth performance of industrial countries. Th us, the end of the "golden age" in industrial countries also marked the end of the "golden age" of development. Nonetheless, other determinants of the cycle are more specifi c and relate to global trade trends (including those associated with commodity markets) and with boom-bust cycles in international fi nancing to developing countries.
Th e global development cycle is depicted in Figure 4 , in terms of the evolution of the weighted and un-weighted average per capita GDP growth of developing countries. Th e oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 disturbed the normal functioning of developed countries economies, generating infl ation and recession, and had important eff ects in developing countries as well (directly and through the recycling of petrodollars). Nonetheless, the dynamics of oil markets had diff erent eff ects on diff erent countries and thus cannot explain the general downturn observed by 1980. To explain that, we turn to two major and largely unexpected shocks that severely aff ected several parts of the developing world. 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 Th e fi rst was the permanent eff ect of the interest rate shock of 1979 ( Figure 5 ). Th e second was the structural downward shift of the terms of trade (Figure 6 ). Th e interest rate shock had no historical precedents. As infl ation promptly receded, real interest rates in the U.S. (using the 10-year Treasury note rate as a benchmark) increased from -1.8 per cent in 1979 to 3.6 per cent in 1981, reaching a peak of 8.2 per cent in 1984. Th e rate faced by developing countries was even higher: the average risk premium paid by developing countries added to the LIBOR rate rose from 2.5 per cent in 1979 to 22 per cent in 1981 in real terms. Having profi ted from the recycling of petrodollars, developing countries suff ered a substantial shock that implied, for many of them, signifi cant balance of payments distress. Th e non-oil commodity terms of trade shock did have precedents, but only in the distant past (in the 1920s). Real non-oil commodity prices experienced a structural downward shift of over 30 per cent, breaking the long stretch since the 1920s when they had been essentially trend-less (Ocampo and Parra, 2003) . Th e price index of manufactures exported by developing countries, relative to manufactures exported by developed countries, experienced a simultaneous downturn. Th e unprecedented character of the interest rate shock and the distant memory of a comparable terms-oftrade shock explain the unexpectedly large magnitude of ex-post risks that developing world had to confront.
Th e debt dynamics of developing countries turned explosive after the interest rate shock and had both short-term and long-term eff ects. Th e proportion of developing countries with moderate debt ratios (over 50 per cent of GDP) had been rising from the mid-1970s but was still low prior to the shock, whereas the proportion with critical debt ratios (over 100 per cent of GDP) was very low ( Figure 5 ). Both increased sharply after the interest rate shock and remained at high levels for the next quarter century, for three basic reasons. Th e fi rst is that real interest rates remained high: over 4.5 per cent for almost twenty years for that same U.S. interest rate; in fact, they only returned to low real levels in the early 2000s. Th e second was the lack of international institutions to manage debt overhangs; this is in sharp contrast to the 1930s, when one such "institution" was available: broad based moratoria. Eventually a few solutions emerged, but had only weak eff ects: the Brady Plan of the late 1980s and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the mid-1990s (still not fully implemented). Th e third was that, together with the hike in interest rates, net fi nancial fl ows became negative. Th us, net resource transfers remained highly negative until the early 1990s 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 WDI- WB Maddison 2001 Source: Authors' calculations of per capita GDP growth based on Maddison (2001) and World Bank World Development Indicators Online.
for a vast number of developing countries. Th e Asian crisis, and its contagion eff ects, interrupted the recovery of the 1990s, although the crisis had weaker and more temporary eff ects than the debt crisis of the 1980s.
Interestingly, the two factors that generated the "lost decade" may at long last be waning. Low real interest rates and the HIPC Initiative may fi nally break the long-term debt overhangs, while Chinese-led growth has strengthened commodity markets. Th ese are some reasons why the global development cycle may be experiencing an upward shift (See Figure 4 above). It is still unclear, however, if these recent trends and their eff ects on the global development cycle will be sustainable, as the disturbance in global fi nancial markets associated with the correction of current global imbalances may lead to higher interest rates or risk 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Source: Grilli and Maw (1988) , Ocampo and Parra (2003) and UN (2003) .
premia, and commodity prices may have already reached a plateau (UN, 2006) . To the extent that ODA to the poorest countries of the world increases, based on the commitments made in recent years, ODA may also become a positive determinant of the global development cycle.
Th e central role played by the global development cycle does not render regional and countryspecifi c factors insignifi cant. Indeed, these factors play an important role, particularly in explaining why a country or region departs from the average trend in either phase of the cycle -i.e., why it does not experience rapid growth during periods of growth success in the developing world as a whole, or why it can mitigate or entirely avoid a growth collapse. Nonetheless, this is an entirely diff erent question than that raised in cross-country econometrics. Th is means that the relevant country-and region-specifi c factors depend on those aff ecting the global development cycle and its domestic transmission mechanisms-and may thus be time-bound. It also implies that short-term dynamics, including the way macroeconomic policy is done, can play a more prominent role than the one usually attributed in the growth literature. It means, fi nally, that long-term determinants of growth-such as institutions, or the level of human capital-largely play a role to the extent that they help explain the capacity of individual countries to benefi t from upward phases and their vulnerability to external shocks during the downward phase of the global development cycle.
Th is can be illustrated by the variable performance of diff erent developing countries during the "lost decade", when, under similar adverse circumstances, some countries ended up in major crises, while others did not. Variance in performance among developing countries has been analyzed from two diff erent angles. Th e fi rst is through characteristics of the macroeconomic adjustment mechanism, and the second is through the institutional eff ects of the massive shocks coming from fi nancial and commodity markets. Th e literature that has analyzed diff erent adjustment mechanism has underscored the virtues of a broader set of macroeconomic instruments, including mixing orthodox with less orthodox instruments (see, for example, Taylor, 1988) . Th e degree of trade liberalization, as measured by the levels of tariff and non-tariff protection, did not play a role in the relative performance of diff erent countries during the 1980s (see, for example, UNCTAD, 1992: Part II, Ch. I), but the degree of macroeconomic instability, defi ned in orthodox terms, did have signifi cant eff ects. Th is is, furthermore, the correct interpretation of the eff ects of several measures of "openness" used in cross-country econometrics, as emphasized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) . Th e possibility and existence of national strategies to profi t from the growing markets in the industrial world for manufactures produced in developing countries did have importance as well (see the next section). But, as indicated in the voluminous literature on East Asian industrialization, the strategy followed by these countries has been quite diff erent from trade liberalization, in the traditional sense (see, for example, Amsden, 2001, and Wade 1990) .
Th e adverse eff ect of infl ation on growth has been used to show the incidence of macroeconomic instability on the relative performance of diff erent countries. Seen in this light, however, infl ation is partly an effect of external shocks. Th is is refl ected in the frequency of episodes of high infl ation in the developing world during the "lost decade". Th at frequency resulted mainly from the broad-based foreign exchange gaps that developing countries faced, which had direct and indirect impacts on domestic infl ation (via devaluation).
As Rodrik (1999) has argued, institutional factors, particularly institutions for managing confl ict, may help explain why, of countries facing the same adverse circumstances, only some ended up with this type of macroeconomic disequilibria. Th is argument gives strong indirect backing to the old Latin American structuralist idea that distributive confl icts underlie infl ation. Other structural factors may have been at work, too. A typical debate in the Latin American literature of the 1980s focused on the "domestic transfer problem" (transferring resources to the government to service the foreign debt). Th is transfer was made more diffi cult in those countries in which the government did not have direct access to foreign exchange (i.e., did not directly or indirectly control the foreign exchange generated by exports), and thus had to guarantee access to foreign exchange through indirect means (see, for example, ECLAC, 1996) . Infl ationary crises were more common in countries where the internal transfer was more diffi cult.
Th ese arguments indicate that external factors have a direct, as well as an indirect, eff ect on performance in developing countries. Th e indirect links are associated with the capacity of individual countries to manage vulnerability, but vulnerability would not have played an important role unless the countries faced an external shock. Th us, the features of the relevant domestic factors are not independent of those of the external variables that determine the global developing cycle. Furthermore, the interaction between external and domestic factors may be contingent on the circumstances surrounding a specifi c period, and their joint eff ect may have long-term implications associated with path dependence.
Th e large and unexpected shocks that the developing world faced in the early 1980s provide the best explanation of the poor average performance of developing countries during the "lost decade", while the relatively direct impact of the shocks, as well as the way economies adjusted to them, provide a fi rst explanation of diverging performance among countries. A second explanation focuses on how domestic institutions or other domestic factors may have aff ected the domestic response to massive shocks. We will concentrate in the next section on a third factor, highlighted in much of the structuralist literature, yet generally ignored in mainstream growth analysis: the role of specialization patterns.
Patterns of specialization
As we have pointed out, the experience of developing countries indicates that growth takes place not in steady fl ows, but in spurts and collapses of diff erent magnitude and frequency. Th e transformation of production structures and the role of specialization patterns are crucial in this context. In a broad sense, long-term growth can be understood as a sequence of sector-specifi c growth spurts, their intensity and the domestic linkages they generate (Ocampo, 2005a) . Th ese spurts are the result of innovations and the transformation of production structures that they induce.
In developed countries, innovations are associated with technological waves-or, perhaps using Schumpeter's (1961) terminology, diff erent forms of innovations or "new combinations". In developing countries, innovations are more closely linked to the attraction of sectors, activities and technologies previously developed in the industrial world. Historically, this has involved processes of import substitution, export promotion or a mix of both strategies. In this context, although macroeconomic policy can certainly block or promote it, steady growth can be essentially seen as the result of a successful sequence of innovations in production structures (i.e., of micro and, particularly, mesoeconomic processes). Th ese sectoral dynamics are ignored or assumed to play a passive role in growth analyses that concentrate on institutional or macroeconomic features and policies. In contrast, it plays a central role in the "structuralist" tradition of economic thinking, broadly defi ned, where growth is viewed as the result of success in managing the dynamic transformation of production structures.
Seen in this light, the major issue over the past quarter century has been the rapid transformation of the structure of developing country exports: primary goods and natural-resource intensive manufactures fell relative to low-, mid-and high-technology manufactures (see Figure 7) . All developing country regions diversifi ed into the more dynamic components of world trade, but East and South Asia diversifi ed much faster (including into low-technology manufactures), followed by Latin America. Th e success stories of the East Asian countries have been related to their achievements in entering external markets, profi ting from dynamic economies of scale and transforming their production structures accordingly.
Th ree factors are important in understanding the links between the evolution of international trade over the past quarter century and the record of economic growth in the developing world. Th e fi rst is the rate of growth of global markets for developing countries' exports. Dynamic markets for such exports can be generated by high income-elasticities of fi nal demand for them in the industrial world, by economies of diversifi cation (i.e., high and rising demand for diversity of designs), or by the transfer of activities to the developing world due to cost factors (particularly wage costs). Th e second factor is the strong dynamic economies of scale that characterize sectors with large technological content. In this regard, it can be expected that specialization in sectors with greater technological content will lead to faster growth. Th e fi rst two factors are linked in practice, as higher technology products are the most dynamic in world trade (Lall, 2001; UNIDO, 2002) . Th e third is the spatial agglomeration that may result from static or dynamic economies of scale. Th is has long been a key issue in regional economics and has taken centre stage in the recent literature on economic geography (see, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) .
In the face of the diverse dynamics that characterize world markets, developing countries can adopt either of two broadly defi ned export strategies: increasing market shares in sectors where a specifi c country has an established position and diversifying into higher technology products. Th e fi rst strategy is widely available; the second may only be available to a limited number of developing countries. Th is is particularly true for high technology exports, where opportunities may be subject to agglomeration eff ects. Opportunities for producing primary goods and natural resource-intensive manufactures are more broadly available, but the dynamism of international markets is limited and can therefore lead to "fallacy of composition" effects. Consequently, the simultaneous entry of several countries into these markets will lead to an oversupply of exports that will be refl ected in falling terms of trade for developing countries as a whole and/or to highcost producers being displaced from the market. Low-tech manufactures fall in between these two cases. Individual countries can succeed with any of these strategies, especially if they implement appropriate productive strategies (see, for example, the success of Chile with the fi rst, or that of the Republic of Korea with the second). However, as a group, developing countries can only succeed, in any market, if fi nal demand is elastic and/or if developed countries lose market shares-provided of course that the process is not hampered by protectionism in the developed countries.
Th e existing literature has explored these issues in diff erent ways. Lall (2001) argues that export structures, being path-dependent, have important implications for growth and development, with highest technology products having the greatest benefi ts in terms of learning and spill-over eff ects, as well as being more dynamic in world trade. Palma (2004) expresses a similar view based on the diff erent capacity that lowvs. high-technology products have in inducing medium-and long-term productivity growth in the economy as a whole, as well as their relative dynamism in world trade. Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) have argued, in turn, that the quality of exports, as indicated in the "income level" of a country's exports (i.e., an estimate of the weighted average income of countries exporting specifi c products, which may be seen to refl ect their technological content), is an independent determinant of economic growth.
Th ese relations have been used to explain East Asia's much superior growth performance. According to Lall (2001) and Palma (2004) , among others, that performance is closely associated with the continuous eff ort, both by the State and the corporate sector, to upgrade export production capacities. UNCTAD (2003) provides a detailed analysis of the signifi cant divergence in the growth of developing countries along these lines. Th e East Asian economies have experienced persistent industrialization drives. In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell in the 1980s and stabilized in the 1990s at relatively low levels. South America has experienced premature deindustrialization, while Mexico and Central America avoided this trend by specializing in high-import intensive manufacturing exports, but with limited benefi ts in terms of growth (see also, in this regard, ECLAC, 2004; Ocampo and Martin, 2004; Palma, 2005) .
Some of the transformation processes involved have links to the external shocks experienced by developing countries-i.e., to the dynamics of the global development cycle. Th us, UNCTAD (2003) argues that the impact of integration into the world economy largely depends on the circumstances under which it takes place and on the policies pursued during the integration phase. Integration of Latin America and Africa (as well as Central and Eastern Europe) marked a sharp shift in development strategy, occurring in a "bigbang" manner and following the debt crisis (i.e., a period of weakness). Th is contrasts with the integration process in East Asia, which occurred from a position of strength and was characterized by a continuous and purposeful strategy of gradual opening up. Expressing it in the Schumpeterian terminology used by Ocampo (2005a) , in East Asia, the "creative" elements prevailed ("creative destruction"), while in other regions of the world, the "destructive" components of the restructuring process were stronger ("destructive creation"), refl ecting the destruction of many import-substitution activities and the weak domestic linkages generated by new export sectors.
Th e development impact of the strategy of a given country would depend not only on success in entering markets, but also on the capacity to capture a share of the value added in the production chain. Th is is, in a sense, obvious and even tautological, for GDP is nothing else but "value added", but it can have broader implications, as those activities with limited value added (e.g., maquila) are also likely to be footloose. In the terms used by Palma (2004) , unless the industries are fi rmly "anchored" in the domestic economy, their growth-enhancing capacity evaporates. Ocampo (2005a) refers to these specialization patterns as "shallow".
According to UNIDO (2002) , middle-and high-tech products represent more than 60 per cent of world total manufacturing exports, mainly due to the dynamic growth of high-tech exports. Th is comes intertwined with the growth of the integrated production systems of multinational fi rms, which have located diff erent parts of the production chains in diff erent locations and countries (UNCTAD, 2002) . Moreover, although the direct and indirect import content of the manufactured exports of developing countries are generally high, and have been rising in recent years, the capacity to capture certain activities (such as assembly tasks) may not lead to rapid growth (UNCTAD, 2002) . Th is is also linked to the relationship the country establishes with FDI: if the strategy to attract FDI is focused, not on creating assets (by providing human resources and infrastructure), but on off ering special incentives to multinational investments, the process can ultimately be counterproductive (Mortimore and Peres, 2001 ).
According to Mayer, Butkevicius and Kadri (2002) , becoming part of an international production network broadens the range of sectors on which developing countries can base their quest for industrialization. Given relative factor endowments, developing countries may begin by acquiring competence for the more labour-intensive components of complex products and gradually move to more skill-and technology-intensive activities. Nonetheless, due to the geographically dispersed production sites, the package of technology and skills available at any one site is narrower, and, more generally, the spill-overs from subcontracting or hosting affi liates of multinational enterprises are reduced. As a result, cross-border backward and forward linkages are strengthened at the expense of domestic ones.
Mayer (2003) reviews the literature on the "fallacy of composition" with an emphasis on labourintensive manufactures. Th e analysis indicates a potential problem in this market, as competition among diff erent developing countries for export shares may reduce the benefi ts from manufacturing exports. Th e likelihood that a country which exports labour-intensive manufactures would be subject to adverse price trends and protectionism in the North has risen with the increasing integration of several highly populated low-income countries into world markets. According to this author, experience in this regard diff ers across diff erent groups of countries. Th e group of countries with the lowest proportion of skill-and technology-intensive manufactures and the greatest proportion of labour-intensive products in their manufactured exports has faced declining terms of trade for its manufacturing exports. Others appear to have succeeded in improving their terms of trade vis-à-vis other developing countries by shifting their exports into higher skill-and technology-intensive manufactures. UNCTAD (2002) also shows that there are signs that the prices of the manufactured exports of developing countries have been weakening in the last 20 years vis-à-vis those of industrial countries, especially for the less skill-intensive manufactured exports (see Figure 6 ). "Fallacy of composition" eff ects are even more important in primary goods, most of which face low income-elasticities of demand in world markets. Indeed, the downward structural shift of non-oil commodity prices in the 1980s may be viewed as the result of the massive export supply generated by developing countries trying to adjust to the debt crises (see Figure 6) . A similar phenomenon may have aff ected manufactures exported by developing countries to the industrial world. According to this analysis, the deterioration of the terms of trade can be better explained by diff erences among countries (developed versus developing countries, diff erent levels of technological capacity, diff erent organization of labour markets, presence or absence of surplus labour, diff erent position in international debt and trade markets, etc), rather than by the characteristics of the goods they export. In other words, the manufactures exported by a large number of developing countries -i.e. labour-intensive manufactures-share some of the disadvantages originally highlighted by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in relation to commodity markets (see Ocampo and Parra, 2006 , who also survey the relevant literature).
Th e terms-of-trade debate has essentially been one about whether developing countries need to industrialize or not. As Sarkar (2001) stated, the policy implication of the classical hypothesis on the evolution of commodity prices 10 was that an agricultural country did not need to industrialize to enjoy the gains from technical progress taking place in manufactures; free play of international market forces would distribute the gains from the industrial countries to the agricultural countries through favourable terms of trade. Prebisch (1950) argued that the asymmetries between the centre and the periphery of the world economy destroyed the basic premise of the international division of labour, making the transmission of technical change in the world economy highly uneven. Th us, for developing countries, industrialization was not an end in itself, but the principal means at the disposal of the countries for obtaining a share of the benefi ts of technical progress and for progressively raising the standard of living of their population.
Th is has generated another debate in which the point of contention is whether there are "commodity-like" characteristics in manufacturing processes in developing countries that place these countries in double jeopardy in their attempts to escape from unequal exchange in world trade. Th is debate has generated what Athukorala (2000) calls the "new terms of trade pessimism", in the sense that it could be self defeating for developing countries to try to industrialize. But several individual case studies for Asia show that this is not necessarily true. Some countries have in fact achieved signifi cant terms of trade gains. Could other developing countries also avoid this "curse"? Th ere are, indeed, grounds for optimism, but only in so far as developing countries take a more pro-active attitude towards promoting technological improvements, industrialization and export diversifi cation.
Th e simple correlation between specialization patterns and growth presented in Figure 8 provides a fi rst look at the relevance of the previous arguments. Economic growth in the developing world is negatively correlated with continued reliance on the exports of primary goods and natural resource-intensive manufactures, but positively correlated with diversifying into mid-and high-tech manufactures, with no clear pattern when we look at low-tech manufactures. Th ere are, however, signifi cant diff erences in performance around the average pattern.
A closer look at this issue shows the interaction between two diff erent variables: success in increasing market shares and specialization patterns. Tables 2 and 3 provide a detailed look at the evidence on the interaction between these two factors. Th e fi rst shows countries that have continued to rely on natural resource based manufactures or primary commodities, while the second looks at countries able to increase market shares in non-natural resource based manufacturing categories. In both cases, we restrict the analysis to sectors that represent at least 20 per cent of the exports of a country in 2002.
Th e evidence presented by these two tables is striking and can be summarized in four major conclusions.
11 First, most countries that have failed to increase shares in world markets are exporters of primary goods or natural resource-intensive manufactures, and all of them experienced either low growth or per-capita GDP contraction. Second, success in increasing market shares in these sectors has been generally associated with weak growth. Indeed, Chile, Seychelles, Oman, Uganda and Egypt are the only cases in the sample of 96 countries analyzed that extracted GDP per capita growth above 2 per cent during 1980-2002 from a strategy based on natural resources (Table 2 ). Other countries that had rapid rates of growth mixed this strategy with low-tech manufactures (Vietnam, Mauritius, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Myanmar) or high-tech manufactures (Costa Rica, which had, in any case, a much lower rate of growth). Th ird, there are cases of countries (Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Nepal and Tunisia) that have extracted rapid growth from a specialization pattern based on low-tech manufactures or, as previously mentioned, by mixing it with natural resource intensive goods, but most developing countries that have grown fast have been increasing market shares in mid-or high-technology exports (Table 3) . Finally, there is, in any case, a signifi cant diff erence in the capacity of Asian countries to extract growth out of these sectors vis-à-vis Latin American (Costa Rica and Mexico), Central European (Hungary and Poland) and West Asian (Turkey) countries. Th is may be related to the "destructive" features of productive restructuring underway outside Asia, but also to the stronger linkages associated with new technology exports in Asia, which are in some cases national, but more generally regional in character. Tables 2 and 3 . Panel A shows the very large diff erence in average growth rates between countries undergoing a transformation of specialization patterns into higher technology exports vs. those specializing in natural resource-intensive sectors, even when they increased market shares in those sectors. Th ose gaining market share in low-tech manufactures fall in between. Panel B shows that countries that still based their exports mainly on primary commodities and natural resource based manufactures in 2002 did not grow in the previous two decades. Countries that grew the most had specialized in two (out of three) non-natural resource based manufacturing categories or only in high-tech manufactures. Mixes involving natural resource exports with non-natural resource intensive manufactures, as well as specialization in low-tech manufactures, fall in between. Th is indicates that specialization patterns, and their evolution over time, do matter. Indeed, few factors among those explored in standard growth regressions can explain diff erences as large as those captured in Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 9 , which are in the order of 3 percentage points per year.
Although the conclusions are not necessarily very encouraging for all developing countries, they indicate that any country wanting to speed up growth should learn from the NIEs' State and corporate eff orts to consistently upgrade export production capacities. Although diversifying into mid-and high-technology exports is not feasible for many developing countries, and there may be agglomeration forces at work that benefi t the already dynamic East Asian regional cluster, there could be opportunities for some of them that should not be disregarded. Most developing countries would have to compete in primary goods, natural resource or low-tech manufacturing exports, where they may face "fallacy of composition" eff ects. Th e medium-term option is clearly to promote the continued opening of markets for these products by industrial countries. In the long term, countries should not hesitate to enter the export learning process, always having in mind the objective of upgrading export capabilities and avoiding stagnation around primary commodities and perhaps even labour-intensive manufactures.
Conclusions
Th is paper analyzes major factors explaining the transition from the "golden age" of fairly widespread growth in the developing world in 1950-1973 to the "dual divergence" since 1980, involving both lower growth rates of developing vis-à-vis developed countries and strikingly diff erent growth experiences among developing countries. It builds from a growing body of literature emphasizing discontinuities in the growth experience of developing countries-growth spurts and collapses-that render traditional cross-country econometrics involving long time periods a rather useless analytical tool. Th e paper builds also on issues traditionally emphasized by the structuralist literature, yet frequently ignored by mainstream development economists.
A clear way to summarize the evidence is that growth successes and collapses tend to cluster in specifi c time periods. It is unlikely that the domestic factors explored in the mainstream growth literature can explain such clustering; so, we have to rely on common external factors. Th e signifi cant increase in the frequency of collapses and the much lower frequency of successes in the last quarter century is the signifi cant diff erence between the period of the "dual divergence" and the "golden age". Th e clustering of successes and collapses implies that a global development cycle has dominated development trends. Th e global development cycle is partly determined by that of the industrial world countries. Th us, the end of the "golden age" in industrial countries also marked the end of the "golden age" of development. However, other determinants of this cycle are more specifi c, and have to do with the functioning of fi nancial markets vis-à-vis developing countries (and, more particularly, emerging markets) and with the major structural downturn experienced by the terms of trade in the 1980s.
Of course, country specifi c factors still play a role, explaining why a country does not experience rapid growth during periods of growth success in the developing world as a whole, or why it can better manage vulnerabilities during downswings of the global development cycle. And domestic policies, particularly pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, are crucial for transmitting the eff ects of external shocks. Nonetheless, the relevant domestic factors are not independent of the external factors that determine the global development cycle. Furthermore, this interaction between external and domestic factors may be contingent on the circumstances surrounding a specifi c period.
Discontinuities in the growth experience are important, due to the path dependence generated by dynamic economies of scale, which refl ect the links between technological learning and production experience. An additional issue, not explored in this paper, is associated with the eff ects of shocks and major institutional changes on State institution-building, due to the complex "learning" process involved.
Discontinuities are also important for development in the sense that long-term growth should be understood as the result of a sequence of sector-specifi c growth spurts, their intensity and the domestic linkages they generate. Th is implies that specialization patterns are crucial to understand growth dynamics. Overall, the evidence presented in this paper underscores the very large diff erence between the average growth of countries undergoing a transformation of specialization patterns into higher technology exports and that of countries experiencing success in primary goods sectors. Th is conclusion is not necessarily very encouraging for developing countries as a whole, for the opportunity to diversify into medium-and high-technology exports may not be available to many of them, given the agglomeration forces at work. In any case, more developing countries should learn from the NIEs' substantive State and corporate sector eff orts to consistently upgrade export production capacities.
Most developing countries would have to compete in primary goods, natural resource or low-tech manufacturing exports, where they are likely to face "fallacy of composition" eff ects. Th e medium-term option is clearly to promote the continued opening of markets for these products by industrial countries. In the long term, countries should be aware of the risk of fallacy of composition, yet simultaneously promote a process of export diversifi cation that creates dynamic comparative advantages and "climbs the ladder" towards more technologically advanced products.
